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3 THE EVOLVING FARM STRUCTURE IN EASTERN GERMANY 
Introduction 
The existing collective farms (LPG's) and state farms (VEG's) left at the end of the German 
Democratic Republic were known to be competitively weak compared to western farms.  These 
enterprises  were  characterized  by  several  problems,  including  worn-out  capital  stocks,  old 
technology, and use of excessive amounts of labor which was specialized and inflexible with 
little  motivation.  The enterprises  themselves  were  of excessive  size and  output was  overly 
specialized.  Factor productivity  was  low  for  both  labor  and  capital  (Agra-EurQPe,  30/91, 
Uinderberichte p. 11; Heller, pp. 29-31).  Only 10-20 percent of  these enterprises were expected 
to be profitable in an EC market (Schmidt, p.  3). Thus, a major issue during the process of 
introducing market forces  into eastern  Germany has  been  the  type of future farms  that will 
emerge. 
The  law  governing  the  shift  from  collective  to  private  agriculture  -- the 
Landwirtschaftsanpassungsgesetz -- formally calls for all business forms to be given an equal 
chance to survive.  Yet if the organizational problems experienced in East German enterprises 
were not unique to their situation,  but rather were a result of generic problems of size and 
cooperative organization, then the issue arises of whether public assistance should be extended 
to successor cooperative forms.  A related issue is whether agricultural policy should steer the 
structural  development of the  sector.  Some expect a  multi-structured  sector with  privately 
owned hybrids of  personal and capital corporations (A~ra-Europe, 30/91, Uinderberichte p. 10). 
Others, including the German Minister of Agriculture, see a private agriculture emerging that 
will be similar to the western family farm structure (A~ra-Europe, 27/91, Uinderberichte p.46). 
The debate over what farm  structure will arise,  what farm structure should arise, and the 
extent to  which  the structural development should be guided  has  been a  favorite of German 
agricultural writers.  A second issue which is intertwined is that of optimal farm size.  This 
paper examines the emerging eastern German  farm  structure.  It does  not fully  develop the 
debate over the advantages of various organizational forms as numerous papers have already 
done  so.  The  first  part  of the  paper  summarizes  the  conflicting  views  over  the  "best" 
organization of farms by considering the advantages and disadvantages mentioned for the family 
farm organization.  The second part of the paper then reviews the related issue of farm size. 
The third section considers the trends already underway in eastern Germany.  The various types 
of organizations are defined, and thereafter, the trends in number and area share are reviewed. 
Finally,  given the developments in  farm  types  and  size the paper speculates over the future 
structure of eastern German agriculture. 
"Family" Agriculture: Advantages and Disadvantages as an Organization Form 
Regardless of country few issues have had the high profile of the "family" farm issue.  The 
opening  lines  of every  u.S.  farm  bill  pay  homage  to  the  family  farm,  as  do  the  Basic 
Agricultural Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and EC agricultural policy.  Yet the 
4 concept of what is a family farm  remains vague.  For this section a broad defmition is used 
where a family farm is a farm where the bulk of the labor and/or the assets are controlled by 
a single family. 
A central issue in the development of eastern Germany is whether the family farm is a 
superior form  of business  organization to  other forms,  and  hence,  should be favored  in the 
measures to assist the sector.  This issue can be posed in two distinct manners.  The fust is 
whether the family farm is a superior organization form in the context of the often cited unique 
characteristics of agricultural production.  A second, and broader context, is whether the family 
farm organization is superior without regard to these special characteristics. 
Agricultural production is often viewed as having "unique" features.  One feature is the 
role of land in production  (Langbehn,  p.  2).  Crops  and  many  types  of livestock are land 
intensive relative to the outputs of other sectors.  Land is a resource with an asset value,  its 
mobility among sectors is limited, and is often specific to only certain types of activities.  Land 
ownership is a major source of the net worth of the sector.  Indeed, commodity policies which 
are frequently couched in terms of income equalization among sectors may be more properly 
viewed as land value preservation or enhancement policies.  A second unique feature is the time 
dependent concentration of labor due  to  the  biological processes of agricultural production. 
Labor in the  sector  must perform sequenced  tasks  at certain  time periods which cannot be 
repeated if improperly or incompletely executed (Langbehn, p. 2).  For example, com planting 
in the United States can be delayed at the cost of yield losses,  but at a point the crop must be 
planted or foregone.  Third, compared to other sectors the returns to labor specialization are low 
(Langbehn, p. 2).  Also there are several positive external effects for labor in agriculture.  A 
major feature of agricultural production is that it occurs under uncontrolled conditions which 
require great flexibility in planning, execution, and a loss of control over the output (Langbehn, 
p. 2).  An unusually wet spring may require shifts in the timing of field operations, in the crop 
mix,  and  in  the  input  use,  yet  leave  the  crop  vulnerable  to  subsequent  adverse  weather. 
Agricultural  markets  also  tend  to  be price and  income inelastic which  means  that technical 
change creates  strong  downward  pressure  on  prices.  Farmers  have  the incentive  to  adopt 
technical change,  but the benefits largely  accrue to  early  adopters  and  in the longer run  to 
consumers of the product. 
In  such  an  environment  supporters  of a  family  farm  based  agriculture  see  several 
advantages  for  that organization form  over all  others.  In a  stochastic environment decision 
making flexibility is seen as critical.  In a family farm decisions are vested in a single individual 
or a  small  group  which  gives  the  process  much  flexibility.  Other  organization  forms  -
corporations or cooperatives -- have hierarchial structures with channels for decision making 
which can be overtaxed by rapidly changing conditions (Langbehn, p. 4).  Larger organizations 
also must pay higher costs for larger administrative staffs and coordination of communication 
becomes  complex  as  changes  in  instructions  occur.  A  related  issue  is  flexibility  in  labor 
allocation among tasks which is seen to be higher in smaller units (Leiber, p. 2). 
Under a cooperative structure as size rises there is an increased separation between the 
ownership of factors and their allocation decisions.  The family farm retains the sovereignty of 
the factor owner for allocation decisions, including the right to determine the division of returns 
between current consumption and investment for the future.  In a cooperative form members' 
5 interests and those of the organization can easily diverge (Langbehn, pp. 4-5).  Under socialism 
the state took over much of this responsibility in East Germany, but with privatization this issue 
reemerges  (Schmitt,  1990, p.  10).  The effect of this division between member interest and 
organizational interests can be seen  in the large number of disputes  now  arising  in eastern 
Germany over division of the value of the collective farms  and  the debt responsibilities of 
members, particularly by those wanting to leave the collective (Steffen, pp. 165-166). 
A  family  farm  is  seen  as  an  organizational  structure  which  generates  a  high  labor 
motivation (Leiber, p. 2).  This flows from the linkage between risks and rewards because the 
factors are owned by the entrepreneur (Langbehn, p. 5).  Cooperative structures tend to suffer 
lower labor motivation  (Wamemiinde, p. 616).  Costs are carried by members, but the return 
accrues to the cooperative -- especially true for the leadership (Langbehn, p. 5).  This problem 
can manifest itself in increased shirking which requires increased supervisory and administrative 
personnel which generally have high wage costs (Schmitt, 1990, p. 7 and 11). 
The advantages of a family farm agriculture noted above are not universally shared.  In 
some cases objections are raised on conceptual grounds.  In other instances it is argued that the 
reestablishment  a  family  farm  structure  in  eastern  Germany  is  not  feasible  given  the 
developments of the past decades. 
Much of the support for family farms arises from the view that the transaction costs of 
other organizational forms are high.  Thus, it is hardly surprising that critics of that support 
argue that the transaction costs are not so  high (Harsche,  22/90,  Markt + Meinung p.  15). 
They argue that the emergence of  large firms in market economies which have come to dominate 
their sectors  shows  that the organizational problems are solvable with the proper system of 
contracts (Harsche, 22/90, Markt + Meinung p. 14).  One advantage for cooperative ownership 
forms is their ability to generate larger sums of capital at more favorable terms (Langbehn, p. 
5).  This allows them to expand size and to thereby reap economies of scale, size, and scope. 
Organizational forms such as stock companies also serve to limit the exposure to risk whereas 
with a family farm the owner must bear the full risk personally.  Among the various possible 
forms  some,  such  as  cooperatives,  are  granted  comparatively  favorable  tax  treatment 
(Wamemiinde, p. 618).  Additional capital formation allows expanded access to new technology 
and the opportunity for horizontal and vertical integration.  Thus, a policy of forcing a family 
farm structure sacrifices cost advantages (Kallfass, pp. 305-313). 
In the eastern German context the argument is also made that returning to a family farm 
structure is not possible and that structural change in the agricultural sector must proceed from 
the  region's  historical  experience  (Harsche,  19/90,  Markt  + Meinung  pp.  3-6).  Western 
Germany retained its tradition of family farms with the necessary requirements of knowledge, 
entrepreneurialship, capital, and risk acceptance (Kallfass, p. 310).  These are missing in the 
east under conditions where labor is specialized, capital formation insufficient, property rights 
unclear,  risks  great,  and rewards  uncertain  (Kallfass,  p.  311).  Surveys  show  few  eastern 
Germans willing to strike out alone in a market economy, rather most prefer to continue to work 
in a  cooperative form.  Agriculture in eastern  Germany is based on large units of a  size to 
capture  scale  economies  and  a  policy  of forcing  a  family  farm  structure risks  creating  an 
inefficient structure and lengthening the crisis (Kallfass, p. 311). 
6 Farm Size:  The Mysterious Optimal Size 
Hidden within the discussion of  organizational structure for agriculture in eastern Germany 
is the  issue of farm  size  and  its  interaction with  per unit production  and  transaction  costs. 
Implicitly assumed is that family farms are small. Thus, the issue emerges of what size captures 
economies of scale in agriculture and how this is related to organizational form.  Transaction 
costs for cooperative types of farms  could exceed those for family  farms,  yet if cooperative 
forms  can  more  than  compensate  through  scale  effects  in  production  they  would  have  a 
competitive advantage.  Thus, the issue is the location and shape of the average cost curves for 
the different enterprise forms. 
In a simple theoretical microeconomic framework as  found  in a textbook this  size and 
organizational issue is straightforward.  Average cost curves for a firm illustrate a "U" shaped 
pattern.  As  per unit total cost falls  economies of scale are reaped  and  size grows.  When 
average  cost is  rising  diseconomies  of scale  are  obtained  and  size  shrinks.  Between  these 
regions lies the minimum average cost where firm  size is optimal.  The organizational form 
whose average unit cost -- for all factors -- is lower has the advantage.  Determining the location 
and  shape  of the  average  cost  curves  for  the  various  enterprise  forms  gives  the  answer. 
Unfortunately the actual process is  not simple and  the answers  from  such  studies have been 
criticized on theoretical, methodological, and empirical grounds.  For example, Schmitt (1992) 
argues that the traditional microeconomic framework presented above is inappropriate for this 
organizational and size issue in the case of agriculture.  He suggests a different approach where 
the farm is viewed as a household rather than as a firm. 
Most studies of farms find the existence of economies of scale, and they suggest that the 
range of outputs over which average cost declines is quickly exhausted.  Once the average cost 
stops falling there is a large range of output over which costs are relatively constant.  Farms 
have the incentive to grow along this range to increase total income but not to reduce per units 
costs (Schmitt, 1990, p. 4).  This means that based on average cost the idea of an optimal farm 
size is very elusive.  Studies show that in western Germany family farms of 70 plus milk cows 
or 250 hectares have very low costs.  Family crop farms in the United States of 600 to 700 or 
more hectares are not unusual.  Farms of these sizes appear to  have exhausted economies of 
scale in production (Leiber, p. 2). 
Conceptually all costs should be included in the analysis.  Because some costs are difficult 
or impossible to measure they are excluded from the analyses.  Transaction costs fall mto that 
category,  thus,  can  be added  only  in a  subjective  manner.  Schmitt (1990)  argues  that  for 
agriculture  the  transaction  costs  of cooperative organizations  quickly  exceed  any  advantage 
obtained in production costs, and hence, these organizational forms are not capable of surviving 
(p.6).  This  conclusion  is  derived  from  the  observation of existing  organizational  forms  in 
market  oriented  agricultures  around  the  world.  Producer  cooperatives  are extremely  rare. 
Corporate forms  exist,  mostly· family  corporations, but are not a major share of farm  types. 
Rather family  farms of various sizes dominate the agriCUltural landscape.  This suggests that 
scale economies including all factors can be obtained at sizes within the reach of family based 
units and that family farms have an advantage over other organizational forms. 
7 Trends in Eastern German Farm Structure during 1990 and 1991 
While  the  above  discussion  argues  that  previous  studies  suggest  no  apparent  cost 
disadvantage for family farms due to organizational structure or size, that alone is not sufficient 
to conclude that a  family  farm  agriculture will arise in eastern  Germany.  That region  has 
operated  under  central  planning  since  1933  and  with  collective  and  state  farms  since  the 
collectivization process began in the 1950's.  After 1960, there were few private farms so that 
many of the preconditions for a private, family based farming structure are missing. 
This section examines the farm structure developments which occurred during 1990 and 
1991.  The process is in an early stage and there is no guarantee that the patterns observed to 
this point will persist.  They could be reflective of  the future or they could merely be a transition 
phase to an entirely different structure.  That is, this section takes a peek at a short time interval 
in a dynamic process. 
The Farm Structure of East Germany 
Before  describing  the  farm  structure  that  is  emerging  it  is  necessary  to  review  the 
structure of agriculture in East Germany during  the communist period.  That structure was 
overwhelmingly dominated by the collective farm (LPG).  As of September 30, 1988 there were 
a total of 3855 collective farms of which  1159 were specialized in crop production and 2696 
were specialized  in  livestock production  (Kurjo,  pp.  13  - 14).  The collective crop  farms 
operated 85.1 percent of agricultural area for an average size of 4500 hectares using over 200 
labor units.  Collective livestock farms were extremely concentrated production units.  They 
accounted for only 1.3 percent of area or roughly 31  hectares per farm.  On that small area 
around 4500 large animal units were held with an average labor use of over 100 labor units. 
In collective farms contributors of land retained nominal ownership of that land but the 
land was jointly operated by the collective members.  The organization of the farm was along 
industrial lines.  The superstructure consisted of a membership assembly, with in principle all 
decision power, and a directorate elected by the assembly which had the day to day operating 
responsibility.  Underneath this structure the collective was organized by function with brigades 
assigned to specific tasks. 
An important feature of  a collective farm was that it was more than just a production unit, 
rather it was more like a community.  Many of the activities normally associated with a rural 
community were undertaken by the collective, including child care, machinery repair, cultural 
activities, and maintenance of village infrastructure. 
A  second type of major agricultural organization in East Germany was the state farm 
(VEG).  These farms were largely formed in the initial post-war land reform from expropriated 
private farms.  All land and inventory was state-owned and operation was again organized along 
industrial  lines  under  a  state  appointed  director.  State  farms  were  also  specialized.  On 
September 30, 1988 there were in total 390 state farms of which 79 were specialized in crop 
production and 311  in livestock production.  The crop specialized  state farms operated  6.4 
8 percent of area and  the livestock farms  0.8 percent of area.  Because  these  farm  tended  to 
concentrate on critical activities like seed production or in breeding animals their importance 
based on numbers or on area is underestimated. 
With the specialization of farms  the interaction between livestock feed  needs and feed 
supplies  was  critical.  Commodities delivered  to  the  state via quotas could  be allocated  by 
decree.  Excess supplies required another mechanism which was satisfied by combining 2 - 4 
livestock farms with a crop farm underneath a cooperative council (KOR).  In 1988 there were 
roughly 1200 of these. 
Despite the pressure to collectivize agriculture a small private farm  structure endured. 
There were  roughly  3000 private farms  and  in conjunction with  church  farms  operated  5.5 
percent of the area. 
Legal Forms for Farms 
Interpreting the data on the emergence of  new farm structures in eastern Germany requires 
some basic information about the major legal forms permitted.  There are two critical categories 
for  farm  organizations -- those of natural persons and  those of legal persons.  Within these 
categories there are various alternatives which individuals may select based on experience, risk 
considerations,  capital  contribution  and  formation  purposes,  tax  considerations,  and  firm 
objectives. This discussion will not cover the details of the differences, rather is designed to give 
an overview of these forms. 
Among  the  natural  person  legal  forms  a  major  type  is  the  individual  family  farm 
(Einzelbetrieb-Familienbetrieb).  The farm leadership and the labor are supplied by the occupant 
of the farm, by the farm couple, or their family ~  Bundesminister, p. 58).  The leadership 
of the farm  has  free and  independent decision  authority  and carries  the risk with unlimited 
liability.  Earnings from the farm cover family labor, owned capital, and risk with the imputed 
allocation a responsibiFty of the family. 
Another  business  form  centered  on  natural  persons  is  a  small  partnership  (Kleinere 
Personengesellschaft).  This  form  is  a  small  partnership  among  two  or more  farmers,  for 
example, between a father and son mer Bundesminister, p. 58).  The objectives of this form 
include  a  division  of  risk,  improved  liquidity,  enhanced  ability  to  finance  operations, 
strengthened  ability to purchase inputs and  sell outputs,  and intergenerational transfer of the 
farm. 
A partnership under civil law (Gesellschaft biirgerlichen Rechts - GbR) is also considered 
a form of personal partnership ~  Bundesminister, p. 59).  Its characteristics include a formal 
treaty governing the farm leadership as well as profit and loss division with great flexibility in 
form and simple procedures for establishment.  Tax treatment is equivalent to the family farm 
and this farm is eligible for all agricultural aids. 
Another  form  of personal  partnership  with  more  members  is  a  limited  partnership 
(Kommanditgesellschaft - KG).  Within the partnership members differ in responsibility and risk, 
9 with some active in the farm's operation and bearing full personal risk for all liabilities, and 
others whose responsibility is limited by agreement to information and examination and whose 
risk  is  limited  to  their  capital  contribution  -- outside  partners.  This  form  combines  the 
responsibility and leadership of the other partnership forms with a limit on the individual's risk 
as found in a corporation. 
There were five types of legal person organizations found in eastern German agriculture 
during  1990  and  1991.  One  was  the  collective  farm  (landwirtschaftliche 
Produktiongenossenschaften - LPG) remaining from the communist period.  This organization 
form was not permissible under West German law transferred to eastern Germany.  Under the 
agricultural adjustment law -- Landwirtschaftsanpassungsgesetz  - this form  was permitted to 
continue in existence until January 1,  1992 for the purpose of reforming into other legal forms. 
Collectives that failed to do so by that date were legally dissolved. 
Another  form  remaining  from  the  Democratic  Republic  years  was  the  state  farm 
(Volkseigene Giiter - VEG).  The goal was to privatize these farms and for that purpose their 
administration was transferred to the privatization agency -- the Treuhandanstalt.  Privatization 
proved to be a complicated and time consuming process due to unclear ownership claims and 
old debt burdens so  that in 1990 and  1991  VEG's continued to  be operated  under Treuhand 
administration or through leasing agreements between the agency and other types of farms. 
A  form  of legal  person  under  West  German  law  is  the  limited  liability  company 
(Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung - GmbH).  This form requires one or more founders, and 
a notarized charter which  must be registered ~  Bundesminister,  p.  60).  The company is 
permitted to be operated by a persons not holding a share in the business.  Its advantages lie in 
limited  financial  liability  for  the  value  of the  business  and  considerable  entrepreneurial 
flexibility. 
Another  option  for  a  legal  person  organization  is  the  joint  stock  company 
(Aktiengesellschaft - AG).  Ownership tends to be spread among many individuals in the form 
of stock certificates.  The individual's risk then depends on the value and number of certificates 
held.  Ownership and operating decisions are often in the hands of very separate groups.  As 
in other legal persons, the decision structure is hierarchial. 
A  form  of legal  person  appearing  in  eastern  German  agriculture  is  the  registered 
cooperative (eingetragene Genossenschaft - eG).  Members share the operation of the business 
with  their vote determined by  their share of the cooperative's value.  Members buy into the 
cooperative and  provision  of in-kind  land,  labor,  and  inventory  are regulated  by  contracts 
(Warnemiinde, p. 617).  The cooperative must be formally registered and requires at least seven 
founding  members.  The decision  hierarchy  of the  cooperative  consists  of a  directorate  --
minimum of two members -- and a supervisory council -- at least three members.  Because every 
member has  a vote some decision  making  flexibility  is lost (Agra-Europe,  34/91, Markt + 
Meinung p. 19).  The cooperative form offers members the chance to create a larger unit and 
to obtain more capital with a relatively favorable tax treatment.  Yet risk may be more than in 
, corporate forms.  Under certain  conditions  liability beyond  the  value of the cooperative is 
possible ~  Bundesminister, p. 60). 
10 Trends Underway 
Agriculture in the Democratic Republic was  dominated by the collective farm  (LPG). 
During 1990 and 1991 restructuring in eastern Germany largely meant replacing this collective 
agriculture with new legal forms.  The extent of this process is shown in table  1.  By April 
1991, the number of LPG's had fallen from 3,855 in September 1988 to 2,287.  From April to 
August another 863 LPG's disappeared, yet 1,424 remained despite the January 1, 1992 deadline 
for reorganization. 
The instrument to recreate a private market based agriculture from the collective farms is 
the Landwirtschaftsanpassungsgesetz passed by the East German Volkskammer shortly before 
economic union with West Germany.  This law contains several critical features and continues-
- with modifications -- to be in effect after German reunification. 
The original law calls for all ownership and business forms to receive equal competitive 
opportunities.  That  includes  family  farms  as  well  as  cooperative organizations voluntarily 
formed by farmers.  In regard to restructuring LPG's, the law contains rules over the transfer 
of assets  to  other business  forms.  Exiting  members  are entitled to  their land and inventory 
contributed to the collective.  If  a return is not possible on economic or legal grounds, exiting 
members can claim compensation of equivalent lands in terms of quantity, value, and quality. 
Departing members can also claim compensation for land rent not received in the past and for 
their share of past profits.  The law also regulates the manner in which the collective dissolves. 
For both restructuring and liquidation the collective must present and have approved a detailed 
plan for division of its value.  The law declares that collectives not restructured by January 1, 
1992 are dissolved  (A~ra-Euro.pe, 29/90, Dokumentation pp.  1 - 14). 
The law was amended in June 1991  to clarify the rules over value with an emphasis on 
outstanding  debt  responsibility,  value  claims  by  departing  members,  and  production  quota 
claims. A responsibility for old debts incurred by the collective directorate was introduced.  The 
rules over claims by exiting members were clarified whereby the return of contributed inventory 
as well as the division of production quotas were given priority.  Additionally, voting rules for 
restructuring and dissolution were amended to give asset owners a stronger voice (A&ra-EurQpe, 
24/91, Underberichte pp 49 - 52). 
The restructuring LPG's face enormous obstacles which  have slowed or in some cases 
halted  the  process.  Decapitalization  of an  LPG  involves  assigning  property  rights  to  and 
valuation of the contribution for hundreds of individuals who often had joined the collective at 
differing  dates  in the absence of functioning  factor  markets.  The task facing  the LPG is to 
determine  who  owns  which  assets,  the  value  of those  assets,  and  the  payment  for  labor 
contributed.  Individuals tend to form into broad groups with greatly different interests.  There 
are owners of land and inventory who desire a high share of returns allocated to assets and a 
quick resolution of  property rights so that the land can be leased or sold.  Another group consists 
of LPG members  who  contributed labor but not  assets.  These individuals can constitute a 
substantial share of the membership and have the incentive to secure as high as possible imputed 
value for labor from the LPG value.  Thus, they are in direct conflict with the first group.  The 
third group consists of future operators who desire to secure the best possible starting conditions 
for their subsequent operations (Heller, pp. 29-30).  The third group is defined by a completely 
11 different criterion than the other groups and can be comprised of members of both groups one 
and two. 
Due to old debts,  unclear ownership claims,  and the various interpretations of the law 
requiring reformation the restructuring LPG's find themselves facing legal actions in court and 
an uncertain future.  Thus, most every decision regarding restructuring is subject to a potential 
challenge and uncertainty over the outcome clouds the future. 
Restructuring of LPG's has also been slow due to a lack of entrepreneurial education and 
willingness of members.  Information on alternative organizational forms, on legal requirements 
and procedures, on tax and policy issues is missing (Henrichsmeyer, p.66).  Knowledge and 
farming experience as well as  the willingness to take  risks had been lost under the socialist 
system  (Heller, p. 30).  Rebuilding these traits requires time.  With restructuring requiring 
complicated legal and economic decisions in an uncertain and rapidly changing environment 
many LPG's have been reluctant to press forward (A&ra-EurQPe,  45/91, Linderberichte p. 54). 
While precise data is hard to obtain there are indications that the restructuring process 
accelerated after August  1991.  Initial estimates  were that 500 - 800 LPG's might dissolve 
without  a  successor  when  the  January  1,  1992  deadline  arrived  (A&ra-Euro.pe,  45/91, 
Linderberichte p. 54).  This fear caused the state of Brandenburg to request an extension of the 
deadline with the argument that there were still many unresolved issues and that the deadline 
would result in the dissolution of many LPG's through no fault of their own.  There had not 
been sufficient time given for such radical changes (A&ra-Europe, 48/91, Linderberichte pp. 2-
3).  The counter argument was that sufficient time had been given to meet the rather modest 
registration  requirements  for  a  new  organization  form  as  in  the  Anpassungsgesetz.  The 
compromise decided was that the deadline was not extended, but LPG's which had reported to 
officials on their intentions to reform but which had  not received approval of all paperwork 
obtained a grace period.  The final estimates of  the number of  LPG's which dissolved varied but 
were under 100 (Scholz). 
Table 1 also shows the types of organizational forms which arose as the restructuring of 
the LPG's proceeded.  One popular new form is the cooperative (eG) which in many cases is 
a  simple change in  the LPG's legal form  combined  with  a  relinking of livestock and crop 
operations  along  with  downsizing  (Henrichsmeyer,  p.  66).  For the  formerly  specialiud 
livestock units  acquiring land  for  manure disposal  is critical  under EC rules.  Downsizing 
reflects both economic pressure and  the separation of community responsibilities.  Decision 
making has improved over the LPG by vesting more responsibility in the directorate.  Managers 
are allowed full freedom of  decision making within broad limits.  The supervisory council bares 
a  controlling  responsibility.  The membership assembly  involvement in  decision  making  is 
limited.  By April 1991, 477 such cooperatives had arisen and in August the number stood at 
830.  One motive for this type of organization is that LPG members had experience working in 
cooperative forms and thus there is much popularity for continuing to do so.  A March 1991 
survey by the University of  Frankfurt of 113 LPG leaders showed a preference for restructuring 
into a  cooperative form  (Ernahrun~sdienst, June  13,  1991).  At that time  16.5 percent had 
already adopted the cooperative form (eG) versus 4.3 percent for the limited liability corporation 
(GmbH).  Future plans were to continue that pattern as 62.5 percent would chose an eG versus 
20.5 percent for the GmbH.  Another motive for the cooperative form as well as the corporate 
12 forms is that in most cases the value share obtained by an individual from the LPG is insufficient 
to create an economically competitive farm given the capital required.  Indeed lack of collateral 
is a critical problem for eastern German farmers trying to take advantage of official investment 
assistance programs.  A cooperative form is seen as pooling enough capital to enable the unit 
to achieve minimum costs while not subject to tax discrimination.  Advocates of cooperatives 
see  gains  due  to the  ability to exploit monopsony  power in input purchases  as  well  as  the 
possibility of gaining  through vertical integration.  Many  cooperatives  are trying  to  control 
livestock from the feeding, to slaughter, to direct consumer marketing.  Some cooperatives are 
developing retail outlets both on farm and in nearby communities. 
The movement to cooperatives is seen as having both positive and negative effects.  Many 
observers question the long-run ability of these enterprises to survive in competition with other 
forms  even if there  are  short-term benefits.  One view  is  that  a  cooperative form  offers a 
reasonable temporary organization for LPG's in transition to a market economy (A&ra-Europe, 
48/91, Kurzmeldungen p. 6).  It is relatively easily accomplished under the majority decision 
rules of the Anpassungsgesetz.  It  retains the value of the collective farm's assets while giving 
time for new  farms and farmers  to emerge.  That is,  the missing experience can be created. 
Yet,  a danger is seen in that the process of using cooperatives might slow the transition to an 
entrepreneurial  based  agriculture  with  individual  ownership  (Steffen,  p.  165).  The  policy 
environment created by the Ee and the German government disadvantages this form  through 
either outright exclusion from some programs or via size limits applied to programs.  Another 
problem with cooperatives is that the interest of private investors in working with this type of 
organization  is  limited,  hence,  hinders  the  ability  of the  enterprise  to  raise  outside  capital 
(Isermeyer, p. 299).  Despite reforms to improve the decision making process and to improve 
labor  incentives,  problems  are  still  encountered.  A  study  of LPG's  that  restructured  into 
cooperatives  by  the  University  of Halle  finds  similar  problems  as  before  with  a  lack of 
motivation  and  inefficiency  (Agra-Europe,  49/91,  Underberichte p.  23).  Thus,  the  early 
experience with cooperatives arising from collective farms is not encouraging. 
Another form of  legal person emerging from the reorganization of  LPG's are the corporate 
organizations -- the GmbH's and AG's.  By April 1991 there were 459 of these and by August 
744 (table 1).  While initially cooperatives (eG) were more popular in the second one-half of 
1991,  corporate forms,  notably  the GmbH gained acceptance (peters).  The corporate forms 
retain the size advantages of the cooperatives.  In concept it has a superior decision framework 
as  the  number  of leadership  voices  is reduced,  but as  many  cooperatives vest considerable 
responsibility in the directorate the practical advantage is less clear.  Also as some of the late 
restructuring LPG's are burdened by old debt,  the risk limitations of the corporate form have 
advantages over the cooperative organization.  Another advantage of the corporation is that it 
allowed asset owners from the LPG to retain value without requiring their direct participation 
in agriculture.  There is also the belief that outside investors are more comfortable with this 
form and that collateral for loans can be more easily secured.  A disadvantage is that tax law 
and  aid  measures  are  not  neutral,  but  rather  are  biased  against  this  form.  Investors  in 
corporations have to assume that other forms will receive favorable policy treatment (Isermeyer, 
p.  301).  Another  disadvantage  for  weak  corporate  organizations  is  the  obligation  to  pay 
members  cashing  their  stocks.  If a  farm  is  weak,  members  can  quickly  cash  their  stock 
certificates.  This  cuts  liquidity  and  further  weakens  the  enterprise.  If the  prospect  is 
bankruptcy,  it is better to take the money early rather than  being left holding stocks of little 
13 value at the end. While concern over possible runs on enterprise liquidity are expressed there 
is little evidence of such behavior by members. 
In terms of  farm numbers natural persons dominate the eastern German landscape.  In 1988 
there were 4,625 legal persons -- collective and  state farms  -- and 3,000 natural persons --
private and church lands (table 1).  By April 1991  there were 9,215 natural person farms and 
in August 12,637.  The bulk of these enterprises were family farms -- in August 1991  12,106 
family farms versus 531 partnerships.  This group of farms is a very heterogeneous one.  There 
are a large number of small farms where agriculture is a secondary activity along side of larger 
more growth oriented family farms which focus on agriculture (Isermeyer, p. 296).  Many of 
these farms involve returning land owners from  the west or farmers  from  the west who lease 
land  from  former  LPG  members.  Although  the  aids  programs  and  tax  policies  favor  the 
reestablishment of family farms, units emerging under former LPG members are often  burdened 
by  weak  management  experience,  limited  area,  and  insufficient  capital  (Steffen,  p.  165). 
Liquidity is  a  major  problem  as  is  a  lack of collateral  to  qualify  for  loans.  As  they  are 
economically  vulnerable  future  directions  in  Ee  farm  policy  and  the  trade  liberalization 
negotiations in  GAIT are seen  as  critical to  their survival.  To avoid  some of these pitfalls 
partnerships have been formed to gain size advantages and some labor specialization (Kallfass, 
p.  311).  While  that  organization  form  creates  a  more  flexible  decision  process  than  a 
cooperative  structure,  it also  requires  a  close  and  trusting  working  relationship  among  the 
partners. 
Within these broad patterns there are regional differences (table 2).  The number of family 
farms dominates in all five states but there is a relationship between the family farm share and 
the  structural  and  natural  conditions  of the  state.  Family  farms  have  the  greatest  relative 
importance in regions with better natural conditions (Agra-Europe, 45/91, Underberichte p. 54). 
This includes areas of Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt.  Areas least favorable on the basis of natural 
conditions -- that is, sandy soils and low moisture -- are Brandenburg and areas of  Mecklenburg-
Pomerania.  These states have fewer family farms and more unrestructured collectives.  Access 
to urban areas also  supports family  farms  which can tap  the demand in  that market and also 
develop a heavy reliance on agriculture as a secondary income source.  This is reflected in the 
high  shares  of family  farms  in  Saxony,  Thuringia,  and  to  some  extent  in  the  figure  for 
Brandenburg.  Another feature reflected in the data is the historical land holding pattern.  Pre-
war land holding patterns were that farm  size rose from  south to north.  The northern larger 
farms were the focus of the first land reform efforts under Soviet military occupation.  These 
expropriations  were not  subject to  return  with  German  reunification.  The smaller southern 
holdings were less affected by early land reform and farms expropriated after 1949 are to be 
returned once the ownership is established.  Thus, the two southern most state -- Saxony and 
Thuringia  -- have  the  largest  shares  in  family  farms  and  the  lowest  shares  remaining  in 
collectives as  of April  1991.  Mecklenburg-Pomerania has  by  far  the largest share of farms 
remaining  as  collectives  and  the  lowest  share  of farms  in  the  family  farm  category  with 
Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt in between. 
The above discussion suggested a pattern of family farms emerging in eastern Germany. 
The area shares by farm  type give a different picture of the structural development (table 3). 
The initial situation in the Democratic Republic was  that LPG's controlled over 86 percent of 
the area, VEG's over 7 percent, and natural persons just over 5 percent.  In April 1991, LPG's 
14 still held 59 percent of the area despite an almost halving of their number.  Other forms were 
increasing their share, but in aggregate legal persons -- LPG's, eG's, and corporations -- held 
nearly 89 percent of the area.  Thus, while natural persons had increased in number from about 
3,000 to 9,215, their share of area rose only from 5.5 percent to 11.3 percent.  Those 8,952 
family farms only held 8.6 percent of the area even though they were nearly 70 percent of farm 
numbers. 
This pattern was  also reflected in  the  August data.  Four months  before their formal 
dissolution, the share of area in collectives had fallen but only to around 37 percent.  Between 
April and August 1991 the share of area controlled by cooperatives rose 73 percent and that for 
corporations by 116 percent.  Meanwhile the area controlled by family farms rose 24 percent -
- numbers increased 35 percent.  Partnership numbers rose 102 percent and area controlled rose 
148 percent, but was still only 5.2 percent of the area. 
German farm leaders could point to a rise of a family farm  structure based on numbers 
(A~ra-Europe, 29/91,  Kurzmeldungen  p.  15).  Yet  on  an  area  basis,  collective agriculture 
remained  dominant  through  August  1991  and  the  restructuring  which  occurred  favored 
cooperatives foremost followed by corporations.  Nearly 84 percent of the area was in the hands 
of legal persons.  Eastern  German  agriculture  had  more of an  appearance of large jointly 
operated units intermixed with a large number of small family farms. 
Not surprisingly this pattern was  confIrmed in the average size data by enterprise type 
(table 4).  A comparison of average size before and after reunifIcation is diffIcult.  Collective 
farms in the Democratic Republic were really rural communities with up to 22 percent of the 
labor devoted to non-farm activities (Grosskopf and Kappelmann, p. 2).  The LPG's and the 
VEG's were also specialized in the areas of crop or livestock production.  After reunifIcation 
many of the non-agricultural functions  were detached,  and livestock and crop activities were 
recombined.  Between  1988  and  August  1991,  the  average  size  of the  collectives  (LPG's) 
actually rose.  Separating the data into crop only LPG's shows that average size shrank from 
4,538 to 3,145 hectares in April 1991.  That was still an extremely large unit.  The emerging 
forms of legal persons also showed large and rising average size.  In April 1991  cooperatives 
averaged 1,697 hectares and corporate forms 760 hectares.  By August the average size of these 
organizational forms had risen to 1,710 and 1,030 hectares, respectively.  In this regard it should 
be noted that these larger average sizes are misleading for they provided a return to more labor 
units.  A 1700 hectare crop cooperative with 20 labor units would have fewer hectares per labor 
unit than many private farms.  Similarly a cooperative with 400 or 800 cows could easily have 
a lower cow to  labor ratio than a  family  farm.  Furthermore, whereas the cooperatives and 
corporations usually involve recombining crops and livestock,  many of the family  farms are 
moving to a largely crop agriculture. 
Among natural persons two opposite trends appeared (table 4).  The average size for a 
family farm fell slightly from 54 hectares in April 1991  to 50 hectares in August.  Meanwhile 
the average size for partnerships rose from  438 to 550 hectares.  Over the period as a whole 
compared to the 3,000 or so private and  church farms  in East Germany  there was a fall in 
average farm size for natural persons.  Nevertheless, these small private farms remained above 
the average  size  for  western  Germany  and  many  treated  agriculture as  a  secondary  income 
source.  Removing farms where agriculture was  secondary raised the average:  Mecklenburg-
15 Pomerania, 170 hectares; Brandenburg, 125 hectares; Saxony-Anhalt, 165 hectares; Saxony, 60 
hectares; and Thuringia, 55 hectares (Isermeyer, p. 296).  Considering only family crop farms 
raised the average size further to 203 hectares,  but here as well, the size for this type lay behind 
other types on average (Agra-Europe. 41191, Sonderbeilage p. 5). Again it should be emphasized 
that on a labor unit basis the size advantage for the other forms over the family farm was not 
clear.  Of the farms visited by the author in terms of  crop operations, family operations, whether 
owners or tenants, tended to operate equivalent area with slightly less labor. 
Some of the slowness in the rise of commercial family farms is attributed to deficiencies 
in functioning market institutions and capital for operators, and in unsure sales (A&ra-EurQpe, 
30/91,  Underberichte p.  10).  Other  sources  include  lack of farming  knowledge  and  risk 
acceptance  (Kallfass,  p.  311).  Discussions with farmers  highlighted a lack of collateral.  A 
former  LPG  member  has  few  assets  for  loan  collateral  and  a  former  VEG  member  has 
essentially none.  Thus, although official lending programs favor establishing or reestablishing 
family farms,  these farmers find it difficult to access enough of the aids to create a viable unit. 
There is a decided advantage for former owners who receive their land back as well as western 
farmers who have collateral from their other operations. 
Table 5 gives a picture of the major production activities by farm type in the spring of 
1991.  The difference between the importance of family  farms  in  number and their relative 
economic contribution was clear.  Of the farm types shown, family farms had 69.8 percent of 
the farm numbers but only 9.5 of  the area.  Collective farms were but 18.9 percent of the farms, 
yet had 64.8 percent of the area.  Among the production activities shown in table 5 family farms 
had  their  strongest  contributions  in  the  grains-oilseeds-Iegumes  category,  11.4  percent,  in 
perennial pasture,  10.3 percent, and in layers, 8.5 percent.  Their contributions in other areas 
were low, especially in livestock.  This reflected a difference in lumpiness in the capital stock 
and land.  Whereas a crop only LPG could relatively easily be divided into various sized units, 
the large livestock facilities were not -- a 400 cow dairy bam could not be subdivided.  Except 
for layers, collective farms dominated all production categories with shares ranging from 62.5 
percent for grains  to  72 percent for cattle.  The layer category showed a radically different 
situation compared to the other categories with a much more even distribution across enterprise 
types.  This  reflected  a  lack  a  concentration  of poultry  in  large  collectivized  units  in  the 
communist period. The largest individual type was the other legal person -- GmbH's and AG's-
- with 48 percent.  This was followed by collectives with 23.3 percent.  In comparison to other 
commodities cooperatives were not very well represented in layers - 5.8 percent.  The shares 
of the types of natural persons in layers were in the same range, from a high of 8.5  percent for 
family farms to a low of 6.7 percent for other natural persons. 
Implications of the Developing Farm Structure in Eastern Germany 
The  transformation  of the  farm  structure  from  a  socialist  system  to  one of private 
ownership in a market economy is underway.  From what has already occurred some thoughts 
on the future farm  structure in eastern Germany can be offered.  The ultimate outcome of the 
farm structure remains uncertain as  many factors affecting the process remain unresolved. 
16 In the  near  term  there  will  be  a  farm  structure  of great  variety.  Farms  will  be 
differentiated by size, legal form, in management, and in ownership and operating relationships 
(Heller, p. 30; Steffen, p.  165).  Often farms will have multiple owners contributing land and 
inventory.  Several will have many leaders as in the case of cooperatives.  During the past year 
there has been a strong  effort by collective farms  to reform  themselves  as  cooperatives and 
corporations.  Yet it is unresolved if such enterprises will survive in a market economy.  The 
theoretical  discussion  suggests  advantages  for  the  family  farm  organization  in  terms  of 
transaction costs.  Empirical research shows that family farms can obtain the sizes needed to 
capture  economies  of  scale.  Despite  attempts  to  streamline  decision  making,  already 
cooperatives have exhibited many of the operating and efficiency problems which plagued the 
collective farms.  Existing assistance programs disadvantage legal persons.  Farms face liquidity 
problems and a lack of collateral.  Thus, it could be expected that a second wave of  restructuring 
will occur as the cooperatives dissolve.  There is a tendency by cooperative members to see their 
problems as policy related and not a result of  organization form.  Dissolution of  these enterprises 
may be associated with disillusion and alienation from a market economy. 
Toward the end of 1991  there was  an  increased  tendency of collective farms  to reform 
themselves into corporations.  This meets the need  to restructure as  required under law,  yet 
avoids some of the operating problems experienced by cooperatives while allowing owners to 
retain their capital.  A corporate form  is also more attractive for outside investors and could 
thereby attract more of the capital badly needed by the sector.  While in concept the larger farm 
could have a long-run cost advantage there remain uncertainties.  One concern is whether the 
corporate  form's  organization  and  decision  structure  is  flexible  enough  for  agriCUltural 
production.  Another concern is again the discriminatory policy environment.  Corporations in 
agriculture are not accorded the favorable tax treatment given to family farms, cooperatives, and 
partnerships.  Also state aids -- such as investment aids -- are both size limited and often exclude 
legal persons.  Thus, .  corporations would need to renounce claims to some of the support given 
to the agricultural sector (Henrichsmeyer, p. 66; Isermeyer, p. 301).  The stock certificate value 
is also a concern.  Corporations short on liquidity could be further undermined as stockholders 
cash their certificates in anticipation of impending financial problems.  In the present situation 
in eastern German agriculture there could be a tendency for corporate farms to self-destruct. 
Finally it should  be noted  that outside of poultry  corporations are rare  in western  German 
agriculture and in the agricultural sectors of other market economies.  This suggests difficulties 
for this organizational form in competition with family farms. 
Although  the  farm  numbers  are dominated  by  family  farms,  their  share  of economic 
activity for the time being is relatively low.  The present farm  structure is one of a modest 
number  of very  large enterprises  intermixed  with  a  large  number of small  farms.  These 
dominant enterprises are generally some form of  joint operation -- a cooperative, a corporation, 
or through  1991  a collective.  Collective agriculture by law disappeared on January 1,  1992. 
The  remaining  cooperatives  and  corporations  are on  average  quite  large  and  thus,  can  be 
expected to have high transaction costs which endanger them. 
A related issue is the emerging size of units, both legal and natural persons.  This unfolds 
in many ways.  Previous research suggests that economies of scale are exhausted at sizes well 
within the reach of family farms and that the incentive to grow is related to income generation. 
While cooperatives and corporations in eastern  Germany are large,  they  are also generating 
17 income for multiple owners and operators.  The same situation is true for the partnerships, 
which although having  an average of 500 hectares,  are to  provide a living for at least two 
operators.  Thus, on a labor unit basis these enterprises may not be larger than the emerging 
family farms. Size interpretations for family farms must differentiate between those units where 
agriculture is the primary income source and those where it is secondary.  In the northern parts 
of eastern  Germany  family  farms  where  agriculture  is  the  primary  income  source  are 
approaching average sizes that western German research  suggest are  needed  to capture most 
economies of scale.  In southern regions sizes of farms in which agriculture is primary appear 
small.  This  suggests  future  pressures  to  grow  unless  incomes  of small  farms  are policy 
supported  and size  linked  measures  are used.  It is likely  that on average farms  in eastern 
Germany will exceed the size of those in western Germany.  But whether farms in the east will 
be of sufficient size to generate adequate incomes should Be agricultural policy be liberalized 
is unclear. 
Regional differences are also appearing.  To some extent these are  similar to pre-war 
patterns  with  larger  units  in  the north  than  in  the  south.  Differences  also  reflect  natural 
conditions with a stronger family agriculture in the better natural areas and more legal persons 
in the poorer regions. Regional differences are also related to outside activity with family farms 
in  areas  of outside  employment  opportunities  relatively  strong.  Such  chances  allow  the 
development of secondary farming around industrial areas -- mainly in the south. 
Differences in production activities by farm type are also emerging, although legal persons 
dominate all major commodities except for layers.  As the structure has shifted to smaller units 
livestock operations have tended to remain in the larger legal persons.  That is,  the smaller 
family  farms  have not,  thus far,  favored  cattle and  hogs.  Rather they have tended towards 
crops.  This reflects the difficulty of dividing the large livestock facilities created under central 
planning. 
In general, the farm structure now arising in eastern Germany appears temporary.  There 
will likely ensue a process in which the present structure of domination by legal person farms 
gives way to one of natural person farms.  The forces creating this adjustment will be problems 
in decision making and the struggle for liquidity and capital formation.  All types face liquidity 
and collateral problems.  Over time stronger management and value creation in natural person 
units  will  likely create a  situation where  these  farms  survive and  present members of legal 
person enterprises depart to form natural person organizations or exit the sector.  That is, the 
legal person units serve a role as a training ground for future farmers but appear unlikely to be 
a sustainable form.  The average size of the farms emerging in this second transformation will 
lie  above  western  German  averages  and  will  be  affected  by  agricultural  policy  through 
discrimination or lack thereof by size.  There will likely continue to be a north-south difference 
with farm size rising moving northward.  An additional characteristic may be a greater reliance 
on land leasing arrangements in eastern Germany as operators create economic units from the 
lands of the  many  owners arising  from  the LPG's.  This  could serve to  make the structural 
transition easier by adding fluidity to land arrangements. 
18 Table 1:  Farm Numbers by Type in Eastern Germany on Selected Datesl 
Type  19882 
Legal Persons: 
Collective Agriculture (LPG)  3855 
Collective Gardens (GPG)  199 
State (YEG)  390-
Other Collective  181 
Cooperatives (eG) 
Other (GmbH, AG) 








Based on applications for adjustment assistance. 
Data from Kurjo, p.  14. 


























99 Table 2:  Farm Numbers by Type and States, April 19911 
Type  Brandenbg  Mecldenbg  Saxony  Saxony  Thuringia 
Pomerania  Anhalt 
Legal Persons:  742  769  679  659  515 
Collectives  528  517  493  491  399 
Cooperatives  119  93  68  111  86 
Other  95  159  118  57  30 
Natural Persons:  1904  1402  2797  1805  1552 
Family  1817  1306  2723  1639  1467 
Partnerships  29  59  45  98  32 
Other  58  37  29  68  53 
Total:  2646  2171  3476  2464  2067 
These data were revised and do not match those in Table 1. 
Source:  A~ra-Europe, 41-91, Sonderbeilage p. 2. 
20 Table 3:  Shares of Area by Farm Type,  1988, April and August 1991 
Type  19881  1991 
April2  Augusf 
Legal Persons: 
Collective Agriculture (LPG) 


















A~ra-Euro.pe, 41191, Sonderbeilage p. 4. 
A~ra-Europe, 5/92, Sonderbeilage p. 2. 
























6  Based on Kurjo's area reported for VEG's and assumed to be in Treuhand 
administration so overstates share to the extent VEG' s were privatized or leased 
to private individuals. 
7  Based on data reported by Kurjo. 
21 Table 4:  Average Size of Farm Types, 1988 and 1991 
Type  19881 
Legal Persons: 
Collective Agriculture (LPG)  1386 
Crops only  4538 
Livestock only  31 
Collective Garden (GPG)  75 
State (VEG)  1151 
Crop only  5013 
Livestock only  170 
Other Collective  28 
Cooperatives (eG) 
Other (GmbH, AG) 






Kurjo, p.  14. 
2 
3 
Agra-Europe, 41191,  Sonderbeilage p. 5 and 7. 
Agra-EurQPe, 5/92, Sonderbeilage p. 2. 
22 
1991 
April2  Augustl 
-- hectares --
1445  1450 
3145 
56  40 
104 
1697  1710 
760  1030 
70 
54  50 
60 
4 
438  550 
127  100 Table 5:  Production Activity Shares by Farm Type in Eastern Germanyl 
Legal Persons  Natural Persons 
Collective  Cooperative  Other  Family  Partner  Other 
- percent --
Numbers  18.9  3.7  3.6  69.8  2.0  1.9 
Area: 
Total  64.8  15.9  6.9  9.5  2.3  0.6 
Grains, Legumes 
Oilcrops  62.5  15.8  6.9  11.4  2.8  0.6 
Feedcrops  69.0  17.0  7.0  5.0  1.5  0.5 
Perno  Pasture  66.6  14.8  6.1  10.3  1.5  0.7 
Cropland  70.8  14.1  6.9  5.9  1.6  0.7 
Cattle2 
Milk  72.0  15.7  6.3  3.4  1.5  1.1 
Other1  72.1  16.4  6.9  2.5  0.9  1.2 
Swine2 
Sows  69.8  15.7  9.0  2.3  0.9  2.4 
Other'  67.7  14.8  10.2  1.5  1.4  4.4 
Layers2  23.3  5.8  48.0  8.5  7.7  6.7 
Excludes State farms (YEG's) 
2  Livestock based on numbers. 
3  Without calves. 
4  Without young pigs. 
Source:  Agra-EurQpe, 41/91,  Sonderbeilage p. 4. 
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